All in the Family: Evaluating Voter Response to Negative Campaign Advertisements in Intra-Party Contests by Sparks, Steven
ALL IN THE FAMILY: EVALUATING VOTER RESPONSE TO NEGATIVE
CAMPAIGN ADVERTISEMENTS IN INTRA-PARTY CONTESTS
Steven W. Sparks
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of
Political Science, Concentration American Politics.
Chapel Hill
2015
Approved by:
Thomas Carsey
Pamela Conover
Michael MacKuen
© 2015
Steven W. Sparks
All rights reserved
ii
ABSTRACT
STEVEN W. SPARKS: All in the Family: Evaluating voter response to negative campaign
advertisements in intra-party contests
(Under the direction of Thomas Carsey.)
Scholars have shown that voters are constrained by party identity in their reactions to nega-
tive attacks sponsored by in-group candidates. If party cues are no longer a reliable source
for evaluating ad content, how do voters interpret and respond to negative advertising? The
present research compares viewer responses to negative political advertising in one-party
and two-party contests. Findings support a theory of “unconstrained backlash” in which
negativity in both types of contests cause similar decreases in evaluations of the sponsor
candidate, but the lack of constraints on party identity cause voters to cast harsher punish-
ments upon ad sponsors in one-party contests.
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Introduction
Televised political advertisements are often credited for their role in shaping voter be-
havior. Political ads enable citizens to learn and retain important distinctions about the can-
didates that they would likely otherwise not learn (Freedman et al. 2004; Jamieson 1992).
Negative political television advertisements, in particular, are credited by many scholars
for having profound effects on voting behavior and electoral outcomes by mobilizing cer-
tain segments of the electorate and therefore increasing turnout (Djupe and Peterson 2002;
Freedman et al. 2004; Jackson and Carsey 2007; Lau and Pomper 2001; Wattenberg and
Brians 1999).
The vast majority of existing research, however, explores how voters respond to negative
political messaging in standard two-party contests (see Carraro and Castelli 2010; Freed-
man and Goldstein 2002; Jackson and Carsey 2007; Lau and Pomper 2001; Matthews and
Dietz-Uhler 1998; Stevens et al. 2008). What receives less attention, however, is how voter
perceptions, and subsequently their voting behavior, are shaped when two competing can-
didates are not from opposing parties. Very little is known about how negative advertising
affects voter behavior in both non-partisan and single-party contexts, yet a vast number of
contests fall within one of these two categories. We cannot yet fully evaluate the true effects
of negative advertising because we do not know how they shape behavior in the absence of
party cues.
Social identity theory explains why we should expect that party competition shapes
voter perceptions of candidates and campaign messaging. When partisanship is activated as
a salient component of social identity (Green 1999), partisanship acts as a lens that shapes
the way that voters process information (Brewer 1993; Green 1999; Tajfel 1978; Tajfel
1981). Partisans view political stimuli with perceptual and attitudinal biases (Tajfel 1978),
causing them to make “us” vs. “them” comparisons with the goal of raising the status of
the in-group and devaluing the status of the out-group (Brewer 1993; Tajfel 1981). When
partisanship no longer creates a bias with which people interpret political information in
the context of a one-party or nonpartisan race, it should be expected that viewer responses
to political advertising will be fundamentally different than in a two-party context.
While voters that dislike negative campaigning may lower their overall evaluation of an
in-group candidate that attacks someone of the out-party, it is expected that they will be
constrained by their partisan identification and ultimately still vote for the in-group candi-
date. When the candidate is attacking someone of the same party, however, this constraint is
no longer present. This paper proposes a theory of unconstrained backlash whereby voters
will be more likely to abandon support for an in-group candidate when they attack someone
of the same party than when they attack someone of the opposing party.
In this study, I conduct an experiment to test whether there is a difference in the way
that respondents perceive and react to negative advertisements in one-party versus two-party
contests. Using a hypothetical race between two candidates running for the U.S. House of
Representatives, I measure respondent vote choices and overall evaluations of the negative
ad sponsor before and after viewing the advertising treatment. Results show that negative
advertising causes similar decreases in evaluations of the ad sponsor in both one-party and
two-party contests, however, respondents are more likely to withdraw support from both
the target and sponsor of the advertisement in a one-party contest.
Partisanship, Social Identity, and Impression Formation
Much of the American electorate lacks a coherent ideological framework and does not
maintain firm positions on most political issues (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964;
Palfrey and Poole 1987; Zaller and Feldman 1992). Voters are likely to favor a particular
candidate or issue based on party cues alone, as partisanship shapes perception of policy,
candidates, and governmental performance (Bartels 2002). It would be a nearly impossible
task for even the most sophisticated voters to learn and maintain detailed information on
every candidate running in every contest during an election cycle. This is especially true
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in low-information contests such as U.S. House elections (Abramowitz 1980; Converse
1966; McDermott 1997; Stokes and Miller 1966), where the majority of citizens are unable
to make sophisticated, well-informed voting choices. Yet despite lacking detailed knowl-
edge of candidates and issues, voters are quite adept at using cues to make ideologically-
consistent decisions (McDermott 1997). Voters use party identification, in particular, as
an information shortcut to make meaningful inferences about candidate ideology (Conover
and Feldman 1982; McDermott 1997; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
Whether caused by party sorting (Levendusky 2009; Nivola and Brady 2006), ideologi-
cal polarization (Abramowitz 2010; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009), or conflict extension (Lay-
man and Carsey 2002), the contemporary party system now presents voters with clearly
distinct images of the two major parties. Even inattentive voters are able to adopt positions
that match up with their party affiliation on issues of which they have little detailed knowl-
edge. With the two parties growing farther apart and easier to distinguish from each other
ideologically, it has become easier for voters to interpret important cues that inform them
about the policy implications that might arise from this inter-party competition.
Party identity plays an important role in the way that people view and interpret the
political world around them. According to social identity theory, membership in a given
group shapes a person’s self-concept through the value and emotional significance that this
membership plays for identity. Humans naturally seek positive distinctiveness for their own
group, which they resolve by making dichotomous social comparisons of “us” vs. “them”
(Brewer 1993; Tajfel 1981). Humans naturally exaggerate perceptual contrasts between
one’s in-group and the out-group (Turner et al. 1987), seeking to raise the status of their
own group while simultaneously lowering their evaluation of the out-group by evaluating
information in a manner that is consistent with this view of the world. In this way, social
identity acts as a lens through which people make evaluations. When an identity becomes
a salient lens in a given context, it leads to perceptual and attitudinal biases that favor the
in-group and devalue the outgroup, altering perception of external actors and events. (Tajfel
1978).
Importantly, partisanship acts as a fundamental aspect of social identity (Green 1999),
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contributing to one’s perception of both the self and the outside world. Therefore, it should
be the case that electoral contexts that make this aspect of a voter’s identity a salient lens
through which they process information will be fundamentally different from those that do
not. When candidates and advertising messages are evaluated in a manner that seeks to
maintain positive distinctiveness for the in-group, there should be important biases in infor-
mation processing that may not be present when party identity is not a salient lens through
which voters process these stimuli. In the context of the present research, it is expected that
partisanship will become a salient component of respondents’ social identity when evalu-
ating a contest between two candidates of opposing parties, but not when both candidates
are of the same party. This should have important consequences for how viewers shape
their candidate evaluations and importantly, how they ultimately make voting decisions in
response to negative advertising.
Given what we know about the effect of partisanship on information processing, how
does the presence or absence of party cues affect the ways that viewers respond to negative
advertising? How do voters react to stimuli when they are no longer able to rely on partisan
cues to shape perceptions as influenced by their social identity?
Constrained Backlash to Negative Advertising in Two-Party Contests
Partisans are susceptible to processing political information through motivated reason-
ing, whereby they view sources that are preference-consistent as credible and trustworthy.
When information does not align with preconceived notions, however, people tend to be
critical and dismissive (Ditto and Lopez 1992; Edwards and Smith 1996; Kunda 1990;
Slothuus and de Vreese 2010; Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber et al. 2009). This behavior
extends to viewer response to televised political advertising, with political messaging being
most powerful when it reinforces and strengthens the perceiver’s expectations and beliefs
about candidates and issues. Viewers have a tendency to reject or ignore advertising content
that is incongruent with their existing beliefs (Nelson and Garst 2005). Citizens also pay
selective attention to positive and negative signals in campaign advertising, depending on
how it conforms with their existing belief structures about the candidate. Moskowitz and
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Stroh use an experimental setting with respondents assigned either a negative or positive
descriptive treatment of a candidate running for office. Respondents emphasized their pol-
icy disagreements with candidates who were described negatively, while they ignored their
policy disagreements with candidates who were described in a positive manner (1996).
While preference-inconsistent information is often discredited and dismissed, it also
tends to further polarize views among partisans. Recent work has shown that when respon-
dents learned additional information about the death penalty (Peffley and Hurwitz 2007),
the Iraq War (Gaines et al. 2007; Nyhan and Reifler 2007), political candidates (Redlawsk
2002), or tax policy (Nyhan and Reifler 2007), the broad finding is that the discovery of new
incongruent information usually further polarizes opinions rather than moderating them.
Not surprisingly, this effect also occurs in response to viewing negative advertisements. An
ad that attacks the candidate of the viewer’s preferred party will typically cause defensive
reactions that favor the in-group rather than cause an erosion of support for the target. Par-
tisans tend to see negative attacks against their favored candidate as unfounded (Stevens et
al. 2008). Televised attack ads also mobilize voters who support the target candidate due to
the perceived threat to their candidate and party (Martin 2004) while simultaneously evok-
ing feelings of sympathy among viewers who support the target candidate, a phenomenon
known as the victim syndrome effect (Franz and Ridout 1997).
While the threshold for tolerance of negativity may be higher when attack ads target the
outgroup, evidence shows that voters are repelled by negativity regardless of who sponsors
the advertisement. Despite the influence of motivated reasoning, voter frustration with
negative advertising isn’t limited to that which comes from the opposing party. People
simply dislike negative attacks; when a viewer’s preferred candidate attacks the opposition,
viewers tend to lower their evaluations of their own candidate, distancing themselves from
their candidate in this backlash reaction once they perceive that the attacks that have gone
too far, a response known as the black-sheep effect (Carraro and Castelli 2010; Matthews
and Dietz-Uhler 1998).
In addition to lowering viewers’ evaluations of the attacking candidate, experimental-
based research on campaign advertising argues that negativity turns voters off from the
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process entirely. When asked about their likelihood of voting, respondents in negative
treatment groups report that attacks make them less likely to go to the polls on election
day altogether (Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Ansolabehere et al. 1999; Kahn and Kenney
1999). There is disagreement about this effect, however, with observational research instead
showing that heightened negativity raises the urgency of a contest, creating a perception of
threat and thereby increasing turnout (Djupe and Peterson 2002; Freedman et al. 2004;
Jackson and Carsey 2007; Lau and Pomper 2001; Wattenburg and Brians 1999).
Despite the lack of consensus between these two strains of research, the important point
is that respondents in experimental settings are so repelled by negative campaigning that
they report a desire to sit the process out entirely. In accordance with the black sheep
effect, voter evaluations in response to attacks aired by their own candidates is so off-putting
that they no longer want to support their own party. It should be meaningful that this
pattern persists even when attacking the opposing team. Given all that we know about
motivated reasoning and the perceptual and attitudinal biases imposed by social identity,
it may be surprising that partisans don’t relish the thought of tearing down the opponent.
The aforementioned research on the black sheep effect and on viewer response to negativity,
however, suggest strongly that viewers dislike negativity without regard for whom the ad is
attacking. It is this mechanism that motivates the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: There should be no difference in the degree to which respondents will
lower their evaluations of an in-group negative ad sponsor, regardless of
whether the candidate is attacking somebody of the opposing party or
somebody of the same party.
Yet the puzzle remains: why do voters say that they are less likely to participate but then
turn out in greater numbers in observational data? Social identity theory helps to explain
why partisans are constrained by their party identity to support their in-group candidate,
even when they perceive their in-group candidate to be a black sheep. In-group members
devalue the status of the outgroup to help maintain positive self-esteem (Hogg and Abrams
1988). This positive self-esteem is also maintained through evaluating deviants within the
in-group more negatively than those in the out-group (Abrams et al. 2014). Those who
betray their own team are viewed as being of lower status than those who are of the op-
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posing team. Voting for the opposing party lowers a strong partisan’s self-evaluation by
placing them among deviants in their own in-group while simultaneously raising the status
of the out-group. We might consider the betrayal felt among Democrats when Georgia Sen-
ator Zell Miller endorsed President Bush for re-election in 2004. The subsequent backlash
among copartisans and branding of him as a “Zell Out” serves as an example of this effect.
This desire to maintain self-esteen and positive distinctiveness helps partisans stay loyalty
to their respective teams.
Negativity in Intra-Party Contests: A Theory of Unconstrained Backlash
Past research explains the role of negative advertising in shaping voter behavior in two-
party contests in which partisanship and social identity act as constraining mechanisms
that limit voters from defecting from their party when campaigns become overly negative.
When both candidates are of the same party, however, partisanship is no longer a salient lens
through which citizens view the dynamics of the contest. Differences in party cues should
not drive vote choice anymore, so the forces of social identity would no longer direct the
voter into viewing the contest in an “us” vs. “them” scenario. Absent the pressures of vot-
ing against their own social identity and thereby supporting the out-group, voters should be
better able to shift their support from one candidate to the next without devaluing the status
and self-esteem they derive from that identity. With the effects of partisan constraint no
longer present, voters should instead demonstrate what I call unconstrained backlash when
their preferred candidate is overly negative. By this, I mean that when negativity leads re-
spondents to lower their evaluations of the ad sponsor in a two-party contest, their backlash
will be constrained by party ID and they should still vote for their in-group candidate. In
contrast, negativity in a one-party setting will not have these same constraining features of
partisanship, allowing respondents to abandon support for their candidate more easily.
Additionally, since social identity theory dictates that people seek positive distinctive-
ness from their in-group (Brewer 1993; Tajfel 1981), voters should find negative attacks
against any candidate of their in-group to be intolerable. Research shows that in-group
members derogate in-group deviants more so than out-group deviants (Abrams et al. 2014).
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Here, candidates that tear down one of their own party members are the ultimate in-group
deviants. If this lowers the threshold for causing a victim syndrome effect among voters
when both candidates are of the in-group, then voters should more readily abandon support
for a candidate in response to negative attack advertisements in intra-party contests.
It is these combined mechanisms that motivate the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The negative ad sponsor will lose more supporters after running a nega-
tive attack in a one-party contest than in a two-party contest.
One might argue that it would be unusual to observe a contest where only one candi-
date goes negative, making these expectations normatively uninteresting. The goal in this
experimental setting, however, is to isolate the impact of negativity on both the sponsor and
the target. An experiment in which both candidates attacked each other would be unable to
isolate this effect, making it unclear whether the evaluation changed because they were the
target or because they were the sender. Here, however, it allows us to isolate effects that
would be next to impossible to disentangle in observational data.
Research Design
To test the theory of unconstrained backlash, I create an experiment to measure can-
didate evaluations and vote choice for a hypothetical scenario in which a candidate who
is of the respondent’s in-group party launches a negative attack against an opponent. The
experimental manipulation included a control group with two candidates of opposite par-
ties, while the treatment group included two candidates that were of the same party as the
respondent.
Respondents were first asked to report their partisan affiliation to determine whether
they would be assigned to a treatment where the ad sponsor was a Republican or a Demo-
crat. Those who reported no party affiliation were asked to choose which party they agree
with most often. Respondents who reported neither party were dropped from the study1
1 In total, 60 of 435 respondents were dropped from the results, representing 13.7% of the original sample.
The final analysis includes 375 respondents.
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Fig. 1: Experimental Treatment Groups
because the experiment is concerned with evaluating the ways in which partisanship shapes
perception of information and changes voting behavior.
Participants were then randomly assigned into one of four treatments shown in Figure 1.
Each manipulation consisted of a hypothetical matchup between two candidates for the U.S.
House of Representatives. The names and photographs of the sponsor candidate and target
candidate were consistent across all four treatment groups. Below, the underlined candidate
indicates the ad sponsor. In each treatment group, the respondent and the ad sponsor are
of the same political party, while the party of the ad target varies between in-party and
out-party members.
Respondents were presented with a side-by-side profile of both candidates, shown in
Figure 2. Candidate profiles from the remaining three manipulations are presented in Ap-
pendix A. Respondents were asked to review the stated positions on three issues: climate
change, abortion, and the economy. These were chosen because they represent three highly
salient issues in the current political climate and allow for distinct preferences to be formed
in a hypothetical laboratory setting.
In all treatment groups, photographs and names of the ad sponsor and target were held
constant. Both candidates are depicted as white males in their early 40s to limit the in-
tervening effects of race, gender, or age for respondent evaluations. Issue positions for
the Republican and Democratic candidates were held constant across both of the two-party
treatment groups. The experiment is investigating respondent evaluations of the ad sponsor,
so issue positions of the ad sponsors in the one-party treatment groups were the same as
those of the ad sponsors in two-party treatment groups. See Appendix A for the complete
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Fig. 2: Two-Party Candidate Profiles for Republican Respondents
!
Jim Esch 
Democrat 
Derek Kilmer 
Republican 
Pro-choice: Abortion should be safe, legal, 
and rare.  Contraception should be provided 
by insurance providers.  
 
Climate Change: Climate change is a 
disastrous consequence of human activity.  
Congress must take action before it’s too late. 
 
Jobs/Economy: We need real tax fairness 
that requires millionaires and billionaires to 
pay their fair share. 
 
 
Pro-life: I am committed to protecting the 
rights of the unborn and reversing pro-abortion 
policies. 
 
Climate Change: Our planet is in a natural 
climate cycle.  Proposals by environmentalists 
will further damage our struggling economy,  
 
Jobs/Economy: The government’s role is to get 
out of the way, helping job creators and 
entrepreneurs by decreasing regulation. 
 
set of candidate profiles used in each treatment group.
After reviewing the candidate issue positions, respondents were asked to rate the neg-
ative ad sponsor according to the ANES 100-point feeling thermometer using a sliding
scale tool. Once this was completed, they were asked to report which candidate for which
they would be most likely to vote. Choices included Derek Kilmer, Jim Esch, Not Sure,
or Neither. This report served as a pre-test of preferences prior to viewing the negative
advertisement.
All respondents then viewed the same 20-second negative advertisement. In the existing
literature on the black sheep effect, we know that there exists some imaginary threshold of
negativity that causes voters to sit out, which occurs when it is perceived that the candi-
date has crossed that line (Carraro and Castelli 2010; Matthews and Dietz-Uhler 1998). If
“crossing the line” translates to unnecessarily nasty in tone, this should happen when ads
are not substantively policy-related and do not convey information that voters deem nec-
essary for an informed vote choice. Therefore, “crossing the line” can be operationalized
as an attack that is personal, character-oriented, and lacking substantive policy statements.
To meet these criteria, the chosen ad had no mention of policy or issues. The ad was a
character-based attack about the opponent’s conviction for driving under the influence of
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alcohol, implying that the candidate therefore lacks the judgment necessary to be an elected
member of Congress. The total runtime of the ad was 20 seconds. Any mentions of party
were removed by editing to allow for consistency across all manipulations.
After viewing the ad, respondents were asked to give their vote choice a second time,
with the options of Derek Kilmer, Jim Esch, Not Sure, or Neither Candidate. They were
also asked to give a second rating of the ad sponsor on the 100-point feeling thermometer.
The survey was then concluded.
This survey2 was conducted twice, once in October 2014 and again in February 2015.
Participants were recruited via e-mail from introductory American government classes at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Students completed the survey online
and received course credit in exchange for their participation.3 In all, 375 individuals
participated in the experiment. There were no significant differences in the results when
comparing the two administrations.
Distribution of respondent ideology and partisanship is presented in Table 1:
Table 1: Respondent Ideology and Partisanship
Ideology N Party ID N
Extremely Conservative 4
Conservative 63 Democrat 156
Somewhat Conservative 83 Democratic Leaner 46
Moderate 50 Republican Leaner 39
Somewhat Liberal 66 Republican 134
Liberal 90 No Affiliation* 60
Extremely Liberal 11
*Respondents with no party affiliation were dropped from the results.
Results
Feeling thermometer evaluations are presented in Table 2. The Initial Rating column
lists the mean respondent evaluation of the ad sponsor prior to viewing the negative ad
2 IRB number 14-2788.
3 The benefits and potential drawbacks of using a student sample are discussed in the conclusion.
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treatment. Interestingly, the mean initial rating for the two-party treatment group is 4.8
points higher than that of the one-party treatment group. A difference in means test shows
these to be statistically different (p < 0.01). When partisanship becomes a salient lens
through which to evaluate the candidates, the baseline evaluation of the ad sponsor raises by
nearly 5 points. The Final Rating column lists the mean evaluation of the sponsor candidate
after the respondent has viewed the negative advertisement. Once again, the negative ad
sponsor in two-party treatment groups is rated 4.7 points higher than in one-party treatment
groups. A difference in means test shows this to be statistically different (p < 0.05). For
both treatment groups, the differences between the Initial Rating and Final Rating means
are statistically different (p < 0.01).
Table 2: Respondent Feeling Thermometer Evaluations of Negative Ad Sponsor
N Initial Rating Final Rating Change
One-Party Races 167 64.8 53.5 -11.1
Two-Party Races 155 69.6 58.2 -10.5
Hypothesis 1 predicted that negative ads would lower respondent evaluations of the
sponsor candidate similarly in both one-party and two-party contests. The results offer
strong support to confirm this prediction. The Change column in Table 2 shows the mean
shift in evaluation between measurements before and after the ad exposure. Mean eval-
uations of the sponsor lowered by 11.1 points in one-party contests and by 10.5 points in
two-party contests, a difference in means that is not statistically significant (p > 0.7). There
is no statistically significant difference between the change in respondent evaluations for the
ad sponsor, regardless of whether the attack is launched against an out-party opponent or an
in-party opponent. Regardless of whether party identification is made salient through a two-
party contest, negativity lowers respondent evaluations of the ad sponsor by approximately
11 points across all treatment group.
This finding offers support to prior research that suggests that partisan voters do change
their candidate evaluations in accordance with the black sheep effect when someone of their
own party “crosses the line” with negative attacks. The novel contribution here is the that
there is no difference between whether the candidate is attacking somebody of the same
12
party or someone from another party. Put simply, respondents don’t like to see candidates
resort to character-based negativity in campaign communications. If there is no meaningful
difference in the degree to which partisans lower evaluations of a candidate of their own
party between one-party and two-party contests, the remaining question is how this lowered
evaluation ultimately shapes voting behavior in both electoral contexts.
In addition to feeling thermometer evaluations, respondents were asked to make a voting
decision based on the information provided about each candidate. Table 3 displays the
change in the percentage of respondents that chose each candidate from before viewing
the negative ad to after viewing the ad. For the ad sponsor, Derek Kilmer, the number of
supporters declined by 7.4 percentage points after respondents viewed the ad when both
candidates were of the same party. In contrast, when candidates were from different parties,
the proportion of respondents supporting Kilmer only dropped by 2.7 percentage points.
Thus, the drop in support for Kilmer after respondents viewed the ad that he sponsored was
4.7 percentage points larger in the one-party treatment when compared with the two-party
treatment. The remaining rows of the table present the same details for the other three vote
choice options offered to respondents: Jim Esch (ad target), Neither, or Not Sure. Starred
rows in Table 3 indicate whether the difference in difference between the two treatment
groups for that vote choice is statistically significantly different.
Table 3: Change in Vote Choice After Negative Ad Treatment
1 Party 2 Parties
Vote Choice
Derek Kilmer (sponsor) - 7.4 PP - 2.7 PP
Jim Esch (target) - 11.6 PP - 3.8 PP*
Neither +4.8 PP +3.2 PP
Not Sure +14.3 PP +4.8 PP*
(N = 189) (N = 186)
*p<.05
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the negative ad sponsor would lose more supporters in a
one-party contest than in a two-party contest. Findings provide evidence to support this
hypothesis, although the difference in differences does not reach the conventional threshold
of statistical significance. Statistical significance is tested through permutation testing to
determine whether that difference in differences is meaningfully different from random
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assignment of the treatment variable (see Appendix B). Greater loss for the ad sponsor in a
one-party contest fails to reach statistical significance at the conventional .05 level, however,
it is worth noting that there is a sizable effect in the expected direction and suggests that the
findings of this study warrant further research with a larger sample.
While these results suggest that respondents are more likely to abandon support for
the negative ad sponsor in a one-party contest, the findings also demonstrate that voters
are more likely to abandon support for the ad target in one-party contests. The targeted
candidate lost 7.8 more percentage points in one-party races, which does reach statistical
significance under permutation testing. When an ad says something negative about some-
body’s preferred candidate, that message is more effective when it comes from a source
within the party than when it comes from a source within the rival party.
One critique of this experiment might be that it could be the case in a laboratory setting
that respondents simply move their support arbitrarily from one candidate to the other in
one-party treatment groups. Results in Table 3 show that this is not the case. Rather, the ad
treatment is leaving voters with uncertainty because they are left with the choice between
one candidate who sponsored a particularly nasty attack and another candidate who, as the
ad claims, used poor judgment and was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Faced with this “lesser of two evils” choice and without a party cue to help them resolve it,
a large number of respondents appear to be choosing simply not to choose either candidate.
The one-party treatment group experienced a 14.3 percentage point gain in respondents in
the Not Sure category, compared with a 4.8 percentage point gain in the two-party treatment
group.
Discussion
Taken together, these findings provide evidence that the presence or absence of party
competition cues will influence the way that voters respond to political messaging. When
partisans use their social identity to view the contest through the lens of an “us” vs. “them”
scenario, they are more likely to retain support for their initial candidate choice after view-
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ing the ad treatment. It should be of no surprise that partisans exhibit motivated reasoning
and motivated skepticism when making voting decisions in a two-party contest. Perhaps
more compelling, however, is the finding that in a one-party setting, voters are more likely
to punish both the sponsor and the target in response to content of the ad. When party iden-
tity no longer constrains respondents to maintain their support for their initial candidate
choice, there is greater flexibility to alter behavior based on the ways that political messag-
ing is perceived and less evidence of motivated reasoning in the interpretation of advertising
content.
The present research also suggests the importance of source cues for respondent evalua-
tions. When respondents who expressed their vote choice as support for the target candidate
see attacks coming from the opposite party, they are less likely to abandon support for that
candidate than if the attack is coming from the same party. This is important for developing
a complete understanding the role of political messaging in primary contests, but not neces-
sarily surprising. Although voters may be more willing to abandon support for an in-group
candidate that attacks a copartisan, the attack is also more effective in eroding support for
the target. It may be that these two mechanisms largely cancel each other out in terms of
overall vote percentages earned by each candidate. More normatively troubling, especially
in the context of the top-two primary where two candidates of the same party may face each
other in the general election, is that single-party contests may ultimately lead to lower voter
turnout as a result of these two mechanisms working together.
While the aforementioned findings have captured a meaningful increase of voter un-
certainty in response to negative advertising in one-party contests, future research should
improve upon this measurement by seeking to uncover how voters handle this uncertainty.
It could be that when facing greater confusion that respondents will seek out additional dis-
tinguishing information about each candidate that may better direct an informed decision.
Uncertainty may lead to less-informed decision-making processes, instead making choices
based on varying idiosyncratic features of the contest. Perhaps most plausible is that exces-
sive negativity in one-party races will ultimately lead voters to abstain from voting in that
contest entirely. It could be the case that abstention in up-ballot, high-salience races could
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have a trickle down effect for lower-ticket contests, ultimately having profound impacts for
participation and outcomes far beyond the original scope of conflict.
There are limitations to the present research that deserve acknowledgment. A larger
sample size in future studies will allow for a stronger test of the theory. Further, using a
sample of university students enrolled in an introductory political science course may raise
concerns for external validity when it’s impossible for the sample to be representative of
the American population as a whole. Further, it may be the case that the young age of the
respondents may translate to partisan identifications that are not as strong or developed as
would be found in a representative adult sample. If this is the case, however, then arguably
this study has served as a conservative test of the hypotheses. Respondents with partisan
identifications that have developed over the course of many years and through many elec-
tion cycles would perhaps demonstrate a sharper difference between the intra-party and the
inter-party treatment groups. Regardless, it is worth noting that past experimental studies
have found no significant differences between samples of college students and nationally
representative adult subjects (Druckman 2004; Marcus et al. 1995).
Further research would also be well served to investigate how respondent behavior is
shaped further by the degree of ideological difference between the candidates. In other
words, it may be important differences between how respondents perceive messaging when
two candidates of the same party are ideologically similar versus when they are not. In other
words, a contest between two ideologically-similar Republicans may elicit far different
results than a contest between a moderate Republican and a Tea Party Republican. In the
latter example, ideological distinctiveness between two copartisans may lead respondents
to exhibit behavior closer to that of a two-party contest.
The novel contribution of the present research has been to demonstrate that partisanship
conditions the way that people respond to negative attacks sponsored by in-group candi-
dates. This study has investigated how the effects of negative advertising differ when re-
spondents no longer interpret messaging through the lens of their party identification and
offered evidence to confirm that the absence of party competition leads respondents to be-
have with unconstrained backlash against the ad sponsor. In contrast, when partisanship is
16
made salient in two-party contests, respondents show that they lower their evaluation of the
negative ad sponsor but are unlikely to abandon support for their party.
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Appendix A: Candidate Profiles
Fig. 3: Two-Party Candidate Profiles for Democratic Respondent
Fig. 4: One-Party Candidate Profiles for Republican Respondents
!
Derek Kilmer 
Republican 
Jim Esch 
Republican 
Pro-life:  Government employee insurance 
plans should not pay for contraception or 
abortions.  
 
Climate Change:  Although we should be 
good environmental stewards, we must create 
policies under which businesses can thrive. 
 
Jobs/Economy: Cutting government 
spending will allow us to lower taxes on 
business that are the engine of our economy.   
 
 
Pro-life: I am committed to protecting the 
rights of the unborn and reversing pro-abortion 
policies. 
 
Climate Change: Our planet is in a natural 
climate cycle.  Proposals by environmentalists 
will further damage our struggling economy,  
 
Jobs/Economy: The government’s role is to get 
out of the way, helping job creators and 
entrepreneurs by decreasing regulation. 
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Fig. 5: One-Party Candidate Profiles for Democratic Respondents
!
Jim Esch 
Democrat 
Derek Kilmer 
Democrat 
Pro-choice: Abortion should be safe, legal, 
and rare.  Contraception should be provided 
by insurance providers.  
 
Climate Change: Climate change is a 
disastrous consequence of human activity.  
Congress must take action before it’s too late. 
 
Jobs/Economy: We need real tax fairness 
that requires millionaires and billionaires to 
pay their fair share. 
 
 
Pro-life: Women should be able to make 
reproductive and health care decisions without 
government interference. 
 
Climate Change: Government should offer tax 
incentives to consumers that encourages green 
technology that invest in green technology and  
 
Jobs/Economy: Raising the minimum wage 
will help working-class families make ends 
meet. 
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Appendix B: Results from Permutation Testing
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